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DIRECTED ENERGY PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY

Abstract: 24-Systems-112

UNCLASSIFIED, PUBLIC RELEASE

Satellite Safety During Laser Firings - DoD Policy, Procedures, and the Laser Clearinghouse

The distinctive characteristics of lasers can present hazards to susceptible satellites. Satellite safety from inadvertent illumination by U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) lasers that are in development, test, exercises, or training is an on-going concern. DoD policy is to apply a comprehensive risk management process that identifies and mitigates the risks of laser hazards to satellites. The U.S. Space Command Laser Clearinghouse (LCH) has been the centralized office for risk management of laser firings above the horizon or into space since 2000. The LCH employs a suitable mitigation process for any laser that presents a hazard to satellites that is greater than other safety of flight and mission risks. One technique is “deconfliction” – an analytical approach that determines when and in what directions it is safe for a laser to fire.
Historically, most laser programs have used a Centralized Deconfliction Process (CDP) where the LCH performs the analysis and provides unclassified deconfliction products to the laser operator. This is an increasingly difficult strategy with the proliferation of satellites and numerous lasers performing deconfliction, especially those on mobile platforms. For this reason, the LCH and other DoD organizations have developed a Decentralized Deconfliction Process (DDP) solution. In this approach, the LCH provides the orbital data for satellites that must be protected while the laser operator uses the data to perform real-time satellite safety calculations. The safety decision-making is performed by the laser system in real-time, often with the advantage of better laser firing opportunities. However, the data and deconfliction processing by the laser system are classified.
In this presentation we describe DoD risk management policy, review the U.S. Space Command processes for implementing satellite safety, and address the LCH mission. We then provide more detail on the CDP and DDP methods. The discussion covers the challenges, design decisions, and methodologies required for the new DDP solution. Next, the innovative Special Use Space Range (SUSR) concept and processes will be addressed. The advantages of conducting testing and operational exercises at a SUSR will be examined. Finally, we summarize the approaches, when each might be used most effectively, and look at the ‘way ahead.’

UNCLASSIFIED, PUBLIC RELEASE